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Abstract
This paper analyzes asymmetric tax competition under formula apportionment. It
sets up a model with multinationals where two welfare-maximizing jurisdictions of
dierent size levy source-based corporate taxes and allocate taxes using the formula
approach. At the Nash equilibrium, tax rates are too low and public goods quanti-
ties are to small. The paper shows that the larger country levies a larger tax rate
compared to the smaller country as it does under separate accounting. Citizens of
the larger country are worse o than those of the smaller country.
JEL Classication: H25, H42, H73.
Keywords: Multinational enterprises, corporate taxation, formula apportionment,
asymmetric tax competition.
Address: University of Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Am Plan 2,
35032 Marburg, Germany, eMail: wrede@wiwi.uni-marburg.de1 Introduction
Ever since Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), it is well known that tax competition leads
to underprovision of public goods when jurisdictions cannot use the full set of tax in-
struments. In response to prot shifting and tax competition, the European Commission
suggested a transition from separate accounting to a common tax base and formula ap-
portionment (see European Commission, 2001). Although the idea seems like a good one
at rst glance, since its inception the proposed benets, namely a reduction in compli-
ance costs, tax planning, and tax competition, have been seriously challenged (see, for
an overview, Fuest, 2008). However, at the subnational level, formula apportionment is
common; examples are, corporate taxation in the US and Canada and the German local
business tax (\Gewerbesteuer").
Regarding tax competition, many scholars have shown that harmonizing the tax base
and employing formula apportionment does not solve the problem of inecient public good
supply. Scholars reach various conclusions as to whether there is under- or overprovision
under formula apportionment. According to Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup
(2009), the positive scal externality of taxation and the negative aggregate investment
externality are responsible for this ambiguity. Pethig and Wagener (2007) argue that
equilibrium tax rates are too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too
high for other formulas. Eichner and Runkel (2008) unambiguously nd underprovision.
Kolmar and Wagener (2007) claim that tax competition leads to suboptimally low tax
rates if and only if the investment elasticity of the tax base is lower than the investment
elasticity of the apportionment factor. Wrede (2009) shows that in the absence of prot
shifting, even under formula apportionment, tax competition leads to underprovision of
public goods. When multinationals are able to shift prots from high-tax to low-tax
countries, overprovision cannot be ruled out. Finally, when jurisdictions can appropriately
tax residents, tax competition does not distort the public good supply. This has been
shown for the standard model of tax competition by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and
has been conrmed for formula apportionment by Eggert and Schjelderup (2003).
Surprisingly, the theoretical literature on formula apportionment and tax competition
has only dealt with symmetric tax competition. Country size dierences were completely
1neglected. The reason is probably that asymmetry in models with decreasing returns to
scale is rather dicult to handle. Nevertheless, this is disappointing from a practitioner's
point of view, since large and wealthy industrialized countries are particularly challenged
by small tax havens. Also from a theorist's perspective the focus on a very special case,
namely symmetric tax competition, is not satisfying.
In the standard framework of tax competition under separate accounting some progress
on asymmetric tax competition has been made. Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991)
show that population dierences imply tax dierences. The smaller jurisdiction levies a
lower tax rate in equilibrium, and its residents are better o than those in the larger
jurisdiction (see also Wellisch, 2000). Hwang and Choe (1995) consider dierences in per-
capita endowments. Depending on income eects of the public good, a poor large region
may choose a lower tax rate. Kanbur and Keen (1993) set up a model with commodity
taxation and cross-border shopping. They show that both the large and the small country
may gain from minimum tax rates. Burbidge and Cu (2005) come up with the result that
the existence of increasing returns can reverse the result that small regions have higher per-
capita utility in Nash equilibria with only capital taxes. According to Wrede (2008), in this
setting the allocation of resources could be improved by a simple scal equalization scheme.
Stoewhase (2005) considers asymmetric capital tax competition when prot shifting is
feasible. Asymmetry is also studied in the literature on tax havens (see, e.g., Hong and
Smart, 2007; Slemrod and Wilson, 2006).
This paper aims at analyzing tax competition under formula apportionment when coun-
tries dier in size. The paper is mainly inspired by Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991).
However, it sets up a model with multinationals where two welfare-maximizing jurisdic-
tions of dierent size levy source-based corporate taxes and allocate taxes using the formula
approach. The framework ist taken from Wrede (2009). In contrast to most papers on
corporate taxation which assume revenue-maximizing governments (see, e.g., Pethig and
Wagener, 2007; Kolmar and Wagener, 2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2008), this paper ana-
lyzes the strategies of welfare-maximizing governments. Private consumption eects, as
well as revenue eects, are considered. Instead of assuming a decreasing returns to scale
technology (see, e.g., Pethig and Wagener, 2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2008) this paper
assumes linearly homogeneous production functions. Since corporate taxes are distorting
2as long as equity is not deductible, even with constant returns to scale, economic prots
are non-zero. Following Eichner and Runkel (2008), the total stock of capital is xed, but
the return to capital is endogenous. Most other papers consider the small-country case
where the return to capital is exogenous (see, e.g., Wellisch, 2004; Pethig and Wagener,
2007; Pinto, 2007; Riedel and Runkel, 2007; Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup,
2009). Pinto (2007) and Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup (2009) analyze tax
competition under formula apportionment in a small, open federation framework where
governments maximize the welfare of their citizens, but only in a symmetric setting.
The main results of this paper can be summarized as the following:
1. Symmetric tax competition under formula apportionment leads to underprovision of
public goods when prot shifting is ruled out.
2. Even under formula apportionment, the smaller country undercuts the larger country.
Residents of the smaller country are better of than residents of the larger country.
Hence, it shows that fundamental features of asymmetric tax competition discovered by
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) still hold true under formula apportionment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and derives the results.
Section 3 concludes.
2 The model
I consider an economy that consists of 2 jurisdictions with population L1 and L2. Each
individual supplies one unit of labor in the country of residence. There are a great many
identical multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating a plant in each jurisdiction. These
rms produce a private good with a constant returns to scale technology. Since the pro-
duction function is linearly homogenous, the number of rms and output per rm are
indeterminate. Without loss of generality, I proceed as if the total output is produced by
a single representative MNE that behaves competitively. It employs Ki units of capital
and Li units of labor in jurisdiction i to produce F(Ki;Li) units of output whose price is
normalized to 1. Marginal productivity of any input is positive and decreasing: FK > 0,
3FL > 0, FKK < 0, and FLL < 0.1 Since the production function is linearly homogenous,
F = FKK + FLL and FKL =  FKKK=L > 0. By assuming that the marginal product
of capital becomes rather large when capital intensity approaches 0, it is ensured that the
MNE will indeed produce in both jurisdictions. For example, the Inada conditions would
guarantee this.
While labor is perfectly immobile, capital is perfectly mobile. Each individual is en-
dowed with k units of capital. The common return to capital, r, is determined so as to
clear the capital market in all jurisdictions; the wage in jurisdiction i, wi, clears the labor
market in this jurisdiction. The capital market clearing condition is
n X
i=1
(Ki   kLi) = 0: (1)
The rm's investment is completely equity nanced and equity is not deductible from
tax liabilities in every jurisdiction. Equity nancing is assumed just for convenience. An
exogenously determined uniform debt-to-capital ratio would leave the results basically un-
altered despite the fact that debt is fully tax deductible. The economic prot in jurisdiction
i is output minus labor costs and capital costs; taxable prots exceed economic prots:
i = 
t
i   rKi; where 
t
i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi i = 1;2: (2)
Total prots net of corporate taxes are denoted by .
Each jurisdiction levies a source-based tax on corporate income while exempting foreign-
source income of domestic residents, where jurisdiction i's tax rate is ti. Under formula
apportionment, the MNE faces a uniform tax rate  independent of investment location.
Tax bases are consolidated and distributed to jurisdictions according to a formula based
on the capital share Ki=
P
j Kj, the sales share F(Ki;Li)=
P
j F(Kj;Lj), and the payroll
share wiLi=
P












; i = 1;2: (3)
The weights of the capital share, the sales share, and the payroll share sum up to 1:
 +  +  = 1. Hence, the jurisdictions' shares also sum up to 1:
P
j Sj = 1. The MNE's
1Partial derivatives are indicated by a subscript.










The representative individual in jurisdiction i derives utility from private consumption,
Xi, and a publicly provided private good, Gi. The utility function, U(Xi;Gi), exhibits
positive and diminishing marginal utilities and is strictly quasi-concave. To exclude corner
solutions, I assume that marginal utilities are suciently large when private and public
consumption approaches 0. The representative individual in jurisdiction i owns one share




+ rk + wi; i = 1;:::;n: (5)
The government of jurisdiction i pays for the provision of good Gi with its tax revenue
Ti. The marginal rate of transformation between the private and the publicly provided
private good is constant and normalized to 1: Gi = Ti=Li. National governments set tax
rates non-cooperatively to maximize the welfare of their citizens U(Xi;Gi). The timing is
as follows:
1. National governments simultaneously set tax rates ti, 0  ti  1, i = 1;:::;n.
2. National wages and the common interest rate are determined such that the MNE
maximizes its prots through choice of labor and capital demand, and markets clear.
At the rst stage, to tackle asymmetry I focus on small deviations from the symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the tax-competition game where all jurisdictions set the same tax
rate. A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by Ki = K, Li = L, wi = w, ti =  = t,
Xi = X, and Gi = G, for i = 1;2.











; i = 1;2: (6)
5The rst-order conditions of the MNE's optimization problem are for i = 1;2










k = 0; (7)










k = 0: (8)
In its decision regarding labor and capital, the MNE takes into consideration that changes
in employment and capital stock aect tax base shares and, therefore, the eective tax rate.
High tax rates reduce marginal benets of employment and investment. In a symmetric
equilibrium Si = 1=n, Si
Lj =  (=L + FL=F)=n2 < 0, Si
Kj =  (=K + FK=F)=n2 < 0,
Si
Li =  (n   1)Si
Lj, and Si
Ki =  (n   1)Si
Kj. At a symmetric equilibrium, the marginal
product of labor is equal to the wage rate and the user cost of capital exceed the interest
rate: FK = r=(1   ).
Plugging rst-order conditions into the denitions for prots and taking linear homo-





































k; i = 1;:::;n:
Economic and taxable prots are non-zero; outside a symmetric equilibrium, even net
prots per country are not zero. However, it can be shown that total net prots  are
zero. Prots and losses cancel out. Hence, individual income consists only of capital and
labor income.
First-order conditions and market-clearing conditions determine how unilateral tax rate
changes aect capital, wages, and the interest rate. Starting at a symmetric equilibrium,
































In response to an increase in one country's tax rate, rms shift capital abroad, which,
due to labor-capital complementarity, reduces wages in the country that raised taxes and
6increases wages abroad. The increase in the tax rate also implies higher user cost of capital,
which mitigates investment incentives and, eventually, reduces the return to capital.
Starting at the symmetric equilibrium, a small increase in populations size leads to
















Furthermore, independent of the formula, for identical tax rates country i's share in tax
revenue is Si = Li=(L1 + L2) such that at the symmetrical equilibrium dSi=dLi = 1=(4L).
Tax competition Governments maximize national welfare which will be written as as
Vi = V (ti;tj;Li;Lj), i = 1;2;j 6= i. Nash equilibria at the tax competition stage are















= 0; i = 1;2: (12)
The marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption is equal to the






Li; i = 1;2: (13)
Since total prots net of taxes are zero, individual income eectively consists only of capital
and labor income, Xi = rk + wi. Hence, the impact of a unilateral tax rate increase on












< 0; i = 1;2: (14)
In response to a tax rate change, wages and capital income and, thus, private consumption













> 0; i = 1;2;  6= i: (15)
Rising wages more than compensate for declining capital income. Taking Equation (9)





















; i = 1;2: (16)














































K; i = 1;2;














































































gives the impact of a country's tax rate on its share in the tax base. Any unilateral increase
in the tax rate reduces the jurisdiction's share in the global tax base no matter what the
weights in the formula are. Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of Si
ti depends positively on
each weight. At the equilibrium of the tax competition game, the tax rate must be on the
upward-sloping part of the country's perceived Laer curve, i.e., dTi=dti > 0. The public
















> 0;i = 1;2;  6= i: (19)
Since both the private consumption externality and the public good externality are positive,
the deviation from the Pareto optimum, at which [@U(Xi;Gi)=@Gi]=[@U(Xi;Gi)=@Xi] = 1
should hold, could be unambiguously signed.
Proposition 1 Under formula apportionment and equity nancing, the symmetric Nash
equilibrium of tax competition is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods.
Both jurisdictions would benet from small increases in tax rates and public good quantities.
Even under formula apportionment, non-cooperatively taxing governments perceive higher









Figure 1: Underprovision of publicly provided goods
tax changes. Figure 1 shows the Nash equilibrium, A, where the perceived production
possibility curve is steeper than the production possibility curve under coordination. The
formula approach does not solve the ineciency problem. In contrast to the case where
prot shifting is present, overprovision could also be ruled out (see Wrede, 2009).
Asymmetry In order to tackle asymmetric tax competition, I consider small deviations
from the symmetric tax competition equilibrium. Without loss of generality, I analyze a
marginal shift of workers from country 2 to country 1. It turns out that, starting at the
symmetric equilibrium, relocating workers from one country to the other has no direct
impact on private and public consumption. When labor is relocated from one country to
the other, capital moves accordingly, leaving wages and capital returns and, hence, private
consumption, Xi, untouched. Moreover, for identical tax rates, aggregate taxable prots,
P2
j=1 t
j, remain unaected, too, since prot decreases in the source country and prot
increases in the destination country cancel out. Since the share of the destination country
in total tax revenue S1 increases by 1=(2L), public consumption, G1 = T1=L1, is also















= FKk > 0:
Using these calculations, the impact of a relocation of workers on the perceived production




















































Since the country considers itself being on the upward-sloping part of the Laer curve
and underprovides the public good, inward labor ows reduces the slope of the perceived
production possibility curve (in absolute terms). Without any tax response, the new curve
is somewhat like the dashed curve in gure 1. By the same token, the perceived curve of
the source country is steeper than in the symmetric equilibrium. In response, the larger
country would raise its tax rate and the smaller country reduces it. As a consequence,
production possibility curves would move in opposite directions. Inwards for the larger
country that taxes capital more heavily, outwards for the smaller one. Presumably, the
outcome of tax rate adjustment is an equilibrium where the larger country levies a higher
tax rate and is worse o than in the symmetric equilibrium while the smaller country
benets from being smaller. That this is indeed the case under conditions of stability
could be shown analytically. From the rst-order conditions of the Nash equilibrium (12),












































































Assuming stability, a simple relationship emerges. The symmetric Nash equilibrium is
stable if and only if d2Vi=dt2
i < 0, i = 1;2, and  > 0. Taking symmetry explicitly into
account, stability implies jd2Vi=dt2
ij > jd2Vi=dtidtjj, j 6= i. Hence, at the stable symmetric













holds. Shifting workers from country 2 to country 1 gives incentives for country 1 to raise
its tax rate if and only if it increases the marginal benet of its tax rate, i.e., if it raises
dV1=dt1. Under the same conditions, country 2 will lower its tax rate in response to a
shrinking population size.
It is possible to sign the impact of the relocation of workers on dV1=dt1. Somewhat









































Kk2t(1      )




















In response to a relocation of workers, the larger country raises its tax rate, the smaller
country reduces it. Still, the basic elasticity argument holds. The larger country faces a
lower tax-rate elasticity than the smaller country.
2Calculations are available from the author upon request.
11Interestingly enough, these changes in size and tax rates hurt the larger country and
benet the smaller one. Taking rst-order conditions (12) into account and the fact that















































































































Moving an innitesimal number of workers from country 2 to country 1 gives incentives
to the now smaller country 2 to reduce its tax rate. As a consequence, capital ows
out of country 1 inducing lower tax revenue and lower wages. Private and public good
externalities of taxation imply a utility loss in the high tax country. By similar reasoning
it could be shown that the smaller country benets.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of the paper:
Proposition 2 Even under formula apportionment and equity nancing, moving an in-
nitesimal number of workers from one country to the other leads to divergence in tax rates
and welfare. Compared to the smaller country, the larger country sets the higher tax rate
and its representative individual is worse o.
3 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed asymmetric tax competition under formula apportionment. Employ-
ing a model with multinationals where two welfare-maximizing jurisdictions of dierent size
levy source-based corporate taxes and allocate taxes using the formula approach, it was
shown that the Nash equilibrium is characterized by tax rates and public good quantities
being too low. The main result of the paper was that the larger country levies a larger
tax rate than the smaller country and that inhabitants of the larger country are worse o
12than those of the smaller country. Hence, it showed that under formula apportionment
and separating accounting dierences in population size have similar eects.
The model could be extended in various ways. In particular, prot shifting could be
incorporated which possibly would make results somewhat ambiguous.
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